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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT 1991: 
A CRITIQUE OF WEST COAST ENT INC 
V BULLER COAL LTD  
Nathan Jon Ross* 
In West Coast ENT v Buller Coal, the majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the effect of the 
Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) Amendment Act 2004 was to remove all 
considerations of the effects of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change. The plain words of the 
amendment provisions only removed such considerations in relation to air discharge and coastal 
permits. However, a literal interpretation of those provisions permitted "back door" regulation via 
ancillary consents of other classes, such as land use consents. The Court concluded, therefore, that 
to avoid that outcome, the purpose of the Amendment Act must have been to remove all 
considerations of emissions and the drafters must have only envisaged that those considerations 
would be relative to air discharge permits. This article re-examines the effect of the 2004 
Amendment Act in light of its purpose and legislative history, and in light of the Principal Act's 
purpose and scheme. It concludes that Parliament was seeking only to remove consideration of 
emissions that were anticipated to be regulated nationally. It identifies a nuanced method of using 
the scheme of the Act to allow that purpose to function whilst avoiding the risk of "back door" 
regulation. This article also critiques the extent to which the majority's interpretation expands and 
alters the meaning of the plain words of the Amendment Act's provisions. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by 
conservation groups against a declaratory judgment made in favour of coal mining companies under 
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the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) (Principal Act).1 That declaration was to the effect that 
decision makers, when considering land use consents to mine coal, cannot have regard to 
subsequent discharges of greenhouse gases when that coal is later combusted.2 
In upholding the declaration made first by the Environment Court3 and upheld also by the High 
Court,4 the majority of McGrath, William Young and Glazebrook JJ concluded:5 
[I]t is not open to territorial authorities and regional councils to regulate activities by reference to the 
effect on climate change of discharges of greenhouse gases which result indirectly from such activities.  
This result was an interpretation of the Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) 
Amendment Act 2004 (Amendment Act), which was being tested primarily against the effect of s 
104(1)(a) of the Principal Act. The Amendment Act removed regional councils' powers to consider 
the effects of greenhouse emissions when dealing with two of the five types of consents under the 
RMA: discharge and coastal permits.6 In contrast, s 104(1)(a) directs consent authorities to have 
regard to "any actual or potential effects on the environment of allowing the activity" when 
considering all types of resource consents.  
The majority concluded, based on the purpose provision of the Amendment Act and the scheme 
of the RMA, that the Amendment Act's effect was not limited to air discharge consents. 
Consequently:7 
[I]n s 104(1)(a), the words "actual or potential effects on the environment" … do not extend to the 
impact on climate change of the discharge into air of greenhouse gases that result indirectly from [an] 
activity.  
Such limitation seems to us to be justified as a matter of necessary implication, essentially on the basis 
that, when the amended RMA is looked at as a whole, the limitation is so obvious that it goes without 
saying. 
  
1  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd [2013] NZSC 87, [2014] 1 NZLR 32; and Resource Management Act 
1991, ss 310–311. 
2  Buller Coal Ltd v West Coast Ent Inc [2012] NZEnvC 80, [2012] NZRMA 401 at [4]. 
3  Buller Coal Ltd v West Coast Ent, above n 2. 
4  Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Buller Coal Ltd [2012] NZHC 2156, (2012) 
17 ELRNZ 220. 
5  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [175]. 
6  Section 87. 
7  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [172]–[173]. 
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This conclusion means that discharges of greenhouse gases can never be considered for any 
activity, except for the benefits to be derived from renewable energy development, which is an 
exception specifically provided for in the Amendment Act. 
In contrast, Elias CJ in dissent8 concluded that the consideration of greenhouse emissions was 
removed only in relation to air discharge permits. That conclusion was reached on the basis of an 
alternative purposive approach. Under this interpretation, consent authorities remained authorised to 
consider effects on climate change of all other planning and consent processes, including the effects 
of the end use of activities.9 
It is contended here that Elias CJ's approach should have been preferred, but with the addition of 
a limiting qualification: that the consideration of greenhouse gas emissions should have also been 
removed in relation to activities that are ancillary to those activities requiring air discharge consents. 
This conclusion is reached after four primary steps of reasoning. First, in Part IV, a purposive 
interpretation is reassessed. This involves reconciling the conflicting purposes of the Principal and 
Amendment Acts, which in turn involves examining the legislative history of the Amendment Act 
relative to the state of affairs that existed at the time. It also entails exploring the relationship 
between the Amendment Act and the Climate Change Response Act 2002 (CCRA). Secondly, in 
Part V, the alternative conclusion is supported by demonstrating how the scheme of the RMA could 
operate effectively with this approach. Thirdly, in Part VI, a critique of the gloss applied by the 
majority to the Amendment Act demonstrates weaknesses in its approach, thereby supporting the 
need for an alternatively reasoned approach. Finally, in Part VII, this analysis shows that it would 
have been appropriate to apply an international law lens to interpreting the Amendment Act. 
II WHY THIS DECISION MATTERS: THE SCIENTIFIC 
CONTEXT 
Before analysing the judgment, it is important to briefly reiterate the imperative for mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions. The science of climate change does not need repeating, but it is worth 
noting that the "greenhouse effect" was groundbreaking only when it was first scientifically 
described in 1824 and that "climate change" was groundbreaking only when it was first 
scientifically described in 1895.10 Any denial of anthropogenic climate change in the 21st century is 
fallacious. 
  
8  Chambers J sat on the hearing but died before delivery of the judgment. The Court delivered its judgment as 
a bench of four under s 30(1) of the Supreme Court Act 2003. 
9  At [4], [69] and [85]. 
10  See David Wogan "Why we know about the greenhouse effect" (16 May 2013) Scientific American 
<www.scientificamerican.com>. 
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Contemporary climate science is predominantly about tracking changes, and improving and 
updating forecasts for risk management.11 It tells us that the safe level of carbon dioxide (CO2)12 in 
the atmosphere is 350 parts per million13 but the current level is around 400 parts per million;14 that 
we are very close to being too late to avoid extreme impacts that will be catastrophic for human 
societies;15 and that net emissions of greenhouse gases will need to be zero some time between 2080 
and 2100;16 but that the rate of global and domestic emissions is still increasing, not decreasing.17  
The "global carbon budget" is the maximum amount of CO2 that can be emitted into the 
atmosphere to have an 80 per cent probability of staying within the internationally agreed maximum 
temperature increase of two degrees Celsius.18 The remaining carbon budget is calculated to be 565 
gigatonnes (billion tonnes) of CO2. Combusting the world's proven reserves of fossil fuels would 
emit around five times that amount: 2,795 gigatonnes of CO2.19 
  
11  See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group I Climate Change 2013: The Physical 
Science Basis: Summary for Policy Makers (2014); and Intergovernmental Group on Climate Change 
Working Group II Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Summary for Policy 
Makers (2014). 
12  There are numerous greenhouse gases and the measurement unit is "carbon dioxide equivalents", which is a 
measure of their global warming potential relative to that of carbon dioxide. However, carbon dioxide is 
globally the most important greenhouse gas. 
13  James Hanson and others "Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?" (2008) 2 The Open 
Atmospheric Science Journal 217–231. 
14  US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration "Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide" Earth 
System Research Laboratory: Global Monitoring Division <www.esrl.noaa.gov>. 
15  See Wogan, above n 10; and S Lovejoy "Scaling fluctuation analysis and statistic hypothesis testing of 
anthropogenic warming" (2014) 42 Climate Dynamics 2339. 
16  United Nations Environment Programme The Emissions Gap Report 2014 (2014) at xv; and Adrian Macey 
"Climate Change: towards policy coherence" (2014) 10(2) Policy Quarterly 49 at 49. 
17  Jon Hovi, Tora Skodvin and Stine Aakre "Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?" (2013) 1(2) Politics 
and Governance 138 at 139; and Ministry for the Environment New Zealand's Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
1990–2012 (2014) at vi–vii. 
18  Copenhagen Accord Decision 2/CP.15 in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, 
held in Copenhagen  from 7 to 19 November 2009: Addendum: Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of 
the Parties at its fifteenth session FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010) [Copenhagen Accord]. There is some 
argument that this maximum was a political compromise and that the scientific evidence points towards a 
maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius. See Michelle Nijhuis "Is 2 Degrees the Right Limit for Global Warming? 
Some Scientists Say No" National Geographic (1 October 2014) <www.nationalgeographic.com>. If that is 
correct, the global carbon budget would be lower. 
19  Carbon Tracker Initiative "Unburnable Coal – Are the world's financial markets carrying a carbon bubble?" 
(2012) Carbon Tracker <www.carbontracker.org>. 
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For New Zealand's part, government estimates are that there are reserves of 15 billion tonnes of 
coal,20 55 million barrels of recoverable oil and 8,214 billions of cubic feet of recoverable gas.21 
Combusting these fossil fuel reserves could generate approximately 26.3 gigatonnes of CO2, thereby 
exhausting 4.65 per cent of the global carbon budget.22 The mines at issue in this case, and the 
emissions that would be inevitable from their development, will contribute to the cumulative effects 
of climate change and of exhausting the global carbon budget. 
III FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A Commission appointed by the West Coast Regional and Buller District Councils granted land 
use consents to develop Buller Coal's Escarpment Mine on the Denniston Plateau. At about the same 
time, Solid Energy was looking to develop the Mount William North Mine. Each of these two mines 
were expected to produce 4.1 million tonnes of coal for export to steel manufacturing industries. 
The total greenhouse gas emissions from combusting 8.2 million tonnes of coal will be 
approximately 20 million tonnes.23 
Since the coal would be exported and combusted overseas, air discharge permits were 
unnecessary. Instead, the consents applied for were land use consents. These were required for 
ancillary elements of the mines: roading; pipe works; a processing plant and handling facility; the 
construction of an electrical substation; and the use, storage and handling of hazardous substances.24  
Conservation organisations, West Coast ENT and the Royal Forest and Bird Society, appealed 
the Commission's granting of consents for the Escarpment Mine on the ground that the Commission 
erred in not giving regard to the effects on climate change. In response, the mining companies 
applied for a declaration that decision makers who are considering applications for land use 
consents for activities associated with coal mining cannot have regard to the effects on climate 
  
20  New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals "Welcome to Coal" Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment <www.nzpam.govt.nz>. 
21  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment "Energy Data File" (2014) <www.med.govt.nz>. 
22  Calculations by the author based on emissions factors (EF per unit) in Ministry for the Environment 
Guidance for Voluntary Corporate Greenhouse Gas Reporting: Data and Methods for the 2012 Calendar 
Year (2014) at 8. For coal, 15 billion tonnes multiplied by EF 1.7 per tonne equals 25.8 billion tonnes of 
CO2 (1.7 is the default EF for coal). For oil, 55 million barrels multiplied by 158.9 litres per barrel 
multiplied by EF 2.94 per litre equals 25.7 million tonnes of CO2 (2.94 is the EF for light fuel oil). For gas, 
8.214 billion cubic feet of gas is 8.792.7 petajoules or 8,792,700,000 gigajoules multiplied by EF 52.8 per 
GJ equals 464.3 million tonnes of CO2 (52.8 is the EF for distributed natural gas). 
23  Buller Coal Ltd v West Coast Ent, above n 2, at [11]; and Royal Forest and Bird v Buller Coal, above n 4, at 
[1]. To put those emissions into perspective, an average car will produce around two tonnes of greenhouse 
gases per annum, and New Zealand's gross emissions in 2012 was 76,048 billion tonnes: New Zealand 
Transport Agency "Toyota Corolla GLX 2014 (current)" RightCar.govt.nz <www.rightcar.govt.nz>; and 
Ministry for the Environment New Zealand's Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2012 (2014) at ix. 
24  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [104]. 
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change of greenhouse gas emissions that arise within or outside New Zealand's territorial boundaries 
from the subsequent combustion of the coal extracted on reliance of those consents.25 That 
declaration was granted. 
Conversely, the declaration that West Coast ENT applied for (but which was declined) was that 
decision makers must, under s 104(1), consider subsequent discharges of greenhouse gases from the 
combustion of the extracted coal and have particular regard, under s 7(i), to the effects of climate 
change.26 Section 7(i) provides that decision makers "shall have particular regard to … the effects of 
climate change". This provision was interpreted in the Environment Court and High Court as 
relating to adapting to climate change ("effects of climate change"), not mitigating the phenomenon 
("effects on climate change").27 The conservation organisations abandoned arguments based on s 
7(i) in the Supreme Court.28 
The remaining issue was the interpretation of ss 3, 70A and 104E of the Amendment Act. 
Section 3, which was not inserted into the Principal Act, provides: 
3 Purpose 
The purpose of this Act is to amend the principal Act— 
(a)  to make explicit provision for all persons exercising functions and powers under the 
principal Act to have particular regard to— 
(i) the efficiency of the end use of energy; and 
(ii) the effects of climate change; and 
(iii) the benefits to be derived from the use and development of renewable energy; and 
(b) to require local authorities— 
(i)  to plan for the effects of climate change; but 
(ii) not to consider the effects on climate change of discharges into air of greenhouse 
gases. 
Sections 70A and 104E were inserted into the Principal Act and they provide: 
70A Application to climate change of rules relating to the discharge of greenhouse gases 
… when making a rule to control the discharge into air of greenhouse gases under its functions under 
section 30(1)(d)(iv) or (f), a regional council must not have regard to the effects of such a discharge on 
  
25  Buller Coal Ltd v West Coast Ent, above n 2, at [4]. 
26  At [5]. 
27  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [130].  
28  At [82]. 
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climate change, except to the extent that the use and development of renewable energy enables a 
reduction in the discharge of greenhouse gases … 
104E Applications relating to discharge of greenhouse gases 
When considering an application for a discharge permit or coastal permit to do something that would 
otherwise contravene section 15 or section 15B relating to the discharge into air of greenhouse gases, a 
consent authority must not have regard to the effects of such a discharge on climate change, except to 
the extent that the use and development of renewable energy enables a reduction in the discharge into air 
of greenhouse gases … 
It is clear that ss 70A and 104E prohibit consideration of greenhouse gases with respect to air 
discharge permits. This was affirmed by the decision of Greenpeace New Zealand Inc v Genesis 
Power Ltd.29 In that case, an air discharge permit was at issue. Greenpeace argued that, under s 7(j), 
the decision maker should have had particular regard to the benefits to be derived from renewable 
energy developments. The development at issue was Genesis's proposed gas-fired electricity plant. 
In effect, Greenpeace was arguing that the emissions from the proposed fossil fuel electricity plant 
should have been compared to the emissions from a hypothetical renewable electricity plant. The 
Supreme Court's conclusion, however, was that s 104E only allowed discharges of greenhouse gas 
emissions to be considered in respect of renewable energy developments per se and not in respect of 
air discharge permits for other types of development.30 One basis for that conclusion was 
Parliament's intention "to ensure that the discharge of greenhouse gases was 'addressed using a 
national mechanism'".31 
In the present case, an air discharge permit was not applied for, so s 104E was not prima facie 
triggered and the Greenpeace decision could be distinguished. The issue, therefore, was whether the 
Amendment Act had been comprehensive in prohibiting the consideration of greenhouse emissions 
(except in relation to renewable energy developments).32 If not, then the climate change effects from 
the end use of activities needing other types of resource consent would remain to be considered 
under s 104(1)(a). Section 104 provides:  
104 Consideration of applications 
(1) When considering an application for a resource consent and any submissions received, the 
consent authority must, subject to Part 2, have regard to— 
  
29  Greenpeace New Zealand Inc v Genesis Power Ltd [2008] NZSC 112, [2009] 1 NZLR 730. 
30  At [65]. 
31  At [59] (footnote omitted). 
32  For readability, it will not be repeated that there is the statutory exemption in ss 70A and 104E that permits 
consideration of the avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions from renewable energy developments. 
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(a) any actual and potential effects on the environment of allowing the activity; 
… 
(2) When forming an opinion for the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a consent authority may disregard 
an adverse effect of the activity on the environment if a national environmental standard or the 
plan permits an activity with that effect. 
IV THE PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION  
A major aspect of the majority's judgment was testing a literal interpretation of s 104E by 
applying it to six hypothetical scenarios.33 In each hypothetical, discharges of greenhouse gases 
were separate to some other element of an activity.  To illustrate, one hypothetical was a concurrent 
application to mine and burn coal, in which the emissions could not be considered with the 
application to burn the coal, but could be considered with respect to the mining.34 In all of the 
scenarios, discharges to air could be considered, not by an air discharge permit, but by the side-route 
of the second matter. Such results, the majority concluded, "would subvert the scheme of the 
[Amendment Act] which leaves climate change effects to the national government and would thus 
deprive s 104E of practical effect".35 This finding meant that the issue fell to be determined by how 
the provisions should be interpreted in light of the purpose of the RMA as amended. The 
preliminary issue, then, was defining that purpose.  
To do that in this analysis, the two definitions of purpose identified by the Supreme Court are 
described in Section A. Following that, fundamental principles of purposive interpretation are 
summarised in Section B. Then, in Sections C–F, a range of matters internal and external to the 
RMA are analysed to identify the purpose and what light it casts upon the meaning and effect of the 
Amendment Act. 
A Duelling Conclusions 
As already said, the majority concluded that the purpose and effect of the Amendment Act was 
to completely remove the ability of consent authorities to regulate activities by reference to their 
greenhouse gas emissions. To reach that conclusion, seven key topics were explored. First was the 
role of the CCRA, which was deemed to be "the machinery" for complying with international 
obligations36 and "left little – and arguably no – scope for useful involvement by local 
authorities".37 Secondly, whilst accepting that activities' consequential effects can be considered, 
  
33  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [157]–[169]. 
34  At [157]–[158]. 
35  At [169]. 
36  At [101] (emphasis added). 
37  At [127]. 
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this is a question "of fact and degree".38 In the present case, "there would always have been scope 
for argument" that downstream effects on climate change were too remote from the particular 
activities at issue.39  
The third aspect related to the coal being combusted overseas. The majority did not attempt to 
resolve this issue and simply noted Whata J's conclusion in the High Court that the RMA does not 
confer jurisdiction to regulate activities extraterritorially.40  
The fourth point was "tangibility".41 According to the majority, "there would have been 
considerable scope" for arguing whether the effects on climate change of burning coal would be 
sufficiently tangible for triggering s 104(1)(a) even before the 2004 Amendment Act.42 This was 
because the coal would supply an existing market which would have sourced coal from other 
suppliers if they were unable to source New Zealand coal. On this assumption, there would be no 
"appreciable difference" to global coal consumption.43 Furthermore, "it would be difficult, and 
probably impossible, to show that the burning of coal would have any perceptible effect on climate 
change".44 That said, the majority did discuss the counter arguments that would rest on the 
definition of "effects" and "cumulative effects" under s 3 of the Principal Act.45 
Fifthly, the majority summarised the scheme of the RMA as relevant to the Amendment Act and 
brought particular attention to the following features: 
(a) the hierarchy of policies and standards: national regulations take precedence over regional, 
which take precedence over territorial;46  
(b) the prohibition of industrial discharges into air except where expressly allowed by national 
or regional instruments;47 and  
(c) the functions of territorial authorities, such as the Buller District Council, which do not 
extend to regulating discharges of contaminants into air.48  
  
38  At [119]. 
39  At [117]; and Royal Forest and Bird v Buller Coal, above n 4, at [42]–[43]. 
40  At [120], citing Royal Forest and Bird v Buller Coal, above n 4, at [51]–[55]. 
41  At [121]–[127]. 
42  At [122]. 
43  At [122](a). 
44  At [122](b). 
45  At [123]–[126], citing Dye v Auckland Regional Council [2002] 1 NZLR 337 (CA). 
46  At [128]–[141]. 
47  At [134]. 
1120 (2015) 46 VUWLR 
Sixthly, various aspects of the legislative history of the Amendment Act were set out,49 but the 
majority downplayed its usefulness because "unfortunately … it gives some mixed signals".50  
Finally, the majority set out the six hypothetical scenarios noted above and concluded that "a 
literal interpretation of s 104(1)(a) would produce anomalous outcomes".51  
The majority does not state which specific provision or provisions its decision is based upon. It 
is virtually certain, however, that the text of ss 70A and 104E is relied on and expanded to 
encompass all types of resource consent. This is because the majority refers to the possibility that 
those responsible for drafting the amendment "assumed the climate change arguments could only be 
advanced in relation to rules and consents involving direct discharges".52 It also seems highly 
unlikely that the majority would have directly applied s 3.53 
The different purpose and scheme approach of Elias CJ led to her defining the effect of the 
Amendment Act as creating discrete exclusions from when greenhouse emissions could be 
considered. This conclusion was reached, first, by considering the Amendment Act in light of pt 2 of 
the Principal Act. The range of matters to be considered under pt 2 – especially the purpose of 
"sustainable management"54 – is unrestricted. Therefore, the activities being consented could not 
properly be characterised as "ancillary" to the "overall mining proposal" and decision makers should 
not be blinkered from assessing effects of end use.55 
Secondly, Elias CJ found that no issue of overseas jurisdiction arose because the activities being 
consented were within New Zealand and because of the global effects of climate change.56 Thirdly, 
Elias CJ considered the workings of s 104: although neither local regulation nor discharge consent 
was at issue, that does not impose exclusions of considerations under s 104(1)(a), which refers to 
"any 'adverse effect of the activity'".57 According to Elias CJ, there was no absurdity or gap that 
  
48  At [131](d) and [134]. 
49  At [142]–[147]. 
50  At [142]. 
51  At [169]. 
52  At [168]. 
53  See Part IV:C, below. 
54  Resource Management Act 1991, s 5. 
55  At [8], [75]–[79] and [84]. 
56  At [9]. 
57  At [4] (emphasis added). 
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justified reading in an exclusion to all considerations of greenhouse gases and doing so would be a 
"substantial gloss" on the RMA as a whole.58 
Fourthly, Elias CJ surveyed materials relevant to the legislative history of the Amendment Act 
and concluded that it was not intended to be comprehensive in its exclusionary effect on climate 
change considerations. Instead, an objective was to provide a stronger mandate to consider climate 
change matters.59  
Finally, Elias CJ deemed s 104E to be not directly relevant to the present case and that national 
management of emissions covered by that provision did not neutralise adverse effects on the 
environment for the purposes of considering other consent types.60 
The duelling interpretations of the purpose of the amended RMA were at the heart of the 
decision, so critiquing the judgment requires examining the purpose afresh. 
B Purposive Interpretation Generally 
Purposive interpretation is, of course, the main method of modern statutory interpretation.61 
Section 5 of the Interpretation Act 1999 stipulates that meaning is derived from a statute's "text" and 
"in the light of its purpose". These two elements create a tension, whereby purpose may be 
constrained by words, but words' meanings may be expanded to effectuate Parliament's intention.62 
The Supreme Court has unanimously emphasised that, even when other methods of statutory 
interpretation are employed or where meaning appears plain, there "should always be cross-
[checking] against purpose".63  
Two important limits are worth noting. The first is the constraints of a provision's text: "there is 
only so far one can 'stretch' the meaning of words" before crossing the constitutional boundary into 
rewriting text.64 Correcting drafting errors and filling gaps in a statute are permissible but only in 
  
58  At [23]–[24] and [72]–[75]. 
59  At [24], [60]–[68] and [85]. 
60  At [70]–[71]. 
61  JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 205–206, 
citing R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 All ER 113 (HL) at 
[21]; and Attorney-General's Reference (No 5 of 2002) [2004] 4 All ER 901 (HL) at [31]. 
62  George Tanner and Ross Carter "The Old Girl Still Looks Good to Me: Purposive Interpretation of New 
Zealand Legislation" (paper presented to the 4th Australasian Drafting Conference, Sydney, August 2005) at 
66; and see Burrows and Carter, above n 61, at 201. 
63  Commerce Commission v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2007] NZSC 36, [2007] 3 NZLR 767 at [22] 
per Tipping J; and see MD Foods plc (formerly Associated Dairies Ltd) v Baines and others [1997] AC 524 
at 532, per Lord Nicholls. 
64  Burrows and Carter, above n 61, at 225. 
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the rarest of circumstances.65 The second limit is that, whilst "[t]he duty of the Court must be to 
attach significance to and obtain help from" a purpose provision,66 its language is often compressed 
and unable to embody the full précis of the statute.67  
Noting the benefits and limitations, the purposive approach is necessary to understand the true 
nature and scope of the 2004 Amendment Act provisions.  
C Reconciling Conflicting Purposes 
Purposive interpretation is sometimes employed to resolve conflicts between provisions within 
the same enactment. Here, however, we are uniquely confronted by having two purpose provisions 
relevant to the same enactment which conflict. On the one hand, we have the Principal Act's purpose 
of "promot[ing] the sustainable management of natural and physical resources".68 On the other, we 
have the Amendment Act's purpose of "requir[ing] local authorities … not to consider the effects on 
climate change of discharges into air of greenhouse gases".69 Climate change is already impacting 
on natural and physical resources domestically and globally, and those effects will intensify as the 
phenomenon continues to be aggravated.70 A reader does not need to be a scientist to see that, 
relative to pt 2 of the RMA, climate change risks undermining the reasonably foreseeable needs of 
future generations and the life-supporting capacity of water, soil and ecosystems, as well as the 
natural character of the coastal environment, wetlands, outstanding natural features, and indigenous 
flora and fauna.71 The question, then, is how might we resolve this conflict? 
Establishing "the" purpose of the RMA relative to the Amendment Act is not necessarily a 
matter of choosing "one or the other". Instead, it is proposed here that the interpreter's role is to first 
try to reconcile the two purposes. In R v Pora regarding conflicting operative provisions, Elias CJ 
said:72 
  
65  Susan Glazebrook "Filling the Gaps" in Rick Bigwood The Statute: Making and Meaning (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2004) 153 at 163. The issue of adding words is discussed in Part VI below. 
66  Ashburton Acclimatisation Society v Federated Farmers of New Zealand Inc [1988] 1 NZLR 78 (CA) at 88 
per Cooke P. 
67  Dominion Air Lines, Ltd (in liq) v Strand [1933] NZLR 1 (SC) at 45. 
68  Resource Management Act 1991, s 5. 
69  Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) Amendment Act 2004, s 3(b)(ii). 
70  See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II, above n 11; and Luke Harrington "The 
role of anthropogenic climate change in the 2013 North Island drought"  (16 October 2014) New Zealand's 
Low-Emission Future: Blog run by Motu and NZCCRI <www.low-emission-future.blogspot.co.nz>. 
71  Sections 5(2) and 6(a)–(d); and see Intergovernmental Group on Climate Change Working Group II, above 
n 11, at 15–18. 
72  R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37 (CA) at [4] per Elias CJ. 
 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE RMA: A CRITIQUE OF WEST COAST ENT INC V BULLER COAL LTD 1123 
 
If the provisions can be reconciled, the meaning which lets them work together is preferred. If they 
cannot be reconciled, the Court has to determine which must give way. 
Also in R v Pora, Thomas J found that both of the conflicting provisions should be interpreted, not 
just the one which came later in time:73  
To my mind, it is not legitimate to focus exclusively on s 2(4) [of the later-in-time Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1999]. Of course, the meaning of s 2(4) is to be ascertained from its text and in 
the light of its purpose. But the same approach must be accorded to s 4(2) [of the earlier Criminal Justice 
Act 1985]. The meaning of that subsection must also be ascertained from its text and in the light of its 
purpose.  
Without authority on resolving two internally conflicting purpose provisions, these principles from 
R v Pora will be applied in an attempt to reconcile s 3 of the Amendment Act and pt 2 of the 
Principal Act, particularly s 5. 
The relevant component of the Amendment Act is s 3(b)(ii), which provides: 
The purpose of this Act is to amend the principal Act … to require local authorities … not to consider 
the effects on climate change of discharges into air of greenhouse gases. 
In the Principal Act, s 5(1) states that the purpose of the RMA is "to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources". Section 5(2) then defines "sustainable 
management" as: 
… managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a 
rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-
being and for their health and safety while— 
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet the 
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
(c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment. 
The purposes and principles of the RMA, pt 2, continue with s 6, which sets out matters of national 
significance for which decision makers "shall recognise and provide for". Section 7 then lists certain 
"other matters" that decision makers "shall have particular regard to", and s 8 provides that persons 
exercising functions under the Act "shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi".74  
  
73  At [127] per Thomas J. 
74  It is outside the scope of this article to explore any implications of climate change measures on the 
principles of the Treaty, such as active protection. 
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The majority did not explore any conflict or relationship between the two purpose provisions. 
On s 3 alone, the majority said, "[i]f the purpose expressed in s 3 had been explicitly carried through 
to the operative provisions of the 2004 Amendment Act this would have disposed of the appellant's 
argument."75 Indeed that would be so since the language of s 3 is patently clear, albeit a very broad 
brush. However, its broad brush language is "only" contained in a purpose provision that was not 
carried through to the Principal Act, so that leaves its precise effect unclear. As Ostler J has 
cautioned:76 
Statutes constantly provide for matters not referred to in their Short Titles, and it is impossible in the 
compressed language in which the Short Title of an Act is expressed to embody a compendious précis of 
the whole of its provisions. 
This guidance is pertinent since we would not expect an enactment's purpose provision to be 
applied literally. That said, the majority's only other reference to s 3 is noting that the mining 
companies' counsel pointed to s 23 of the Interpretation Act: "An amending enactment is part of the 
enactment that it amends."77 There is no discussion on any effect of this correlation but one might 
infer from the majority's carte blanche expansion of the application of ss 70A and 104E that s 3 was 
read literally as an operative provision. If so, there are flaws with this approach. First, s 3 is a 
purpose provision so its function is limited to casting light on the meaning of text.78 Secondly, there 
is no evidence in the Amendment Act nor its legislative history that Parliament intended to alter the 
purpose of the RMA by limiting the sustainable management objective nor the mandatory 
considerations in ss 6 to 8.79 Thirdly, the conflict between s 3 and s 5 ought to have been identified 
and reconciled, as per R v Pora. Fourthly, s 3 itself, as well as those operative provisions at issue, 
ought to have been interpreted in light of s 5 of the Principal Act. 
The importance of s 5 is undeniable. Recently, its role was discussed at length by a differently 
constituted Supreme Court in Environmental Defence Society v New Zealand King Salmon (EDS v 
King Salmon).80 The Court said, inter alia: 
  
75  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [97]. 
76  Dominion Air Lines Ltd (in liq) v Strand, above n 67, at 45 per Ostler J 
77  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [140]. 
78  Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1); and see Burrows and Carter, above n 61, at 219–220. 
79  Indeed, the considerations in s 7 were expanded by adding considerations: ss 7(ba) ("the efficiency of the 
end use of energy"), 7(i) ("the effects of climate change") and 7(j) ("the benefits to be derived from the use 
and development of renewable energy"). See West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [58] and 
[82]–[83]. 
80  Environmental Defence Society Inc v New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 38, [2014] 
NZRMA 195. 
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 "the obligation of those who perform functions under the RMA to comply with the 
statutory objective is clear";  
 "Section 5 is a carefully formulated statement of principle intended to guide those who 
make decisions under the RMA"; and  
 "Section 5 sets out the core purpose of the RMA".81 
Critically, the majority in EDS v King Salmon concluded that sustainable management is an 
objective to be met, not merely a guide to interpretation, and so environmental bottom lines are 
legitimate:82 "the RMA envisages … a cascade of planning documents, each intended, ultimately, to 
give effect to s 5".83 
Notwithstanding its paramount importance, the majority in West Coast v Buller did not refer to s 
5 at all, other than when setting out the scheme of the RMA. Sections 6–8 were not referred to 
either, except for discounting the relevance of s 7(i). There is no attempt in the majority's judgment 
to interpret either the purpose or operative provisions of the Amendment Act in light of the purpose 
of the Principal Act.   
It is contended here that, by omitting reference to s 5, the majority's approach was inconsistent 
with s 5 of the Interpretation Act and with the approach to the same provision in the subsequent 
EDS v King Salmon decision. The only potential reason for ignoring a purposive approach was if the 
literal meaning was clear, but that was emphatically rejected by the majority via their hypothetical 
examples. It was not sufficient to interpret ss 70A and 104E only in light of the purpose of the 
Amendment Act. Rather, the Amendment Act should have also been read in light of the purpose and 
principles of the Principal Act.  
As for relying solely on s 3 of the Amendment Act for purposive interpretation, which is what 
appears to be the basis of the majority's reasoning, there is no evidence s 3 was intended to affect the 
purpose of the Principal Act. For these reasons, this analysis agrees with the conclusion of Elias 
CJ:84 
I doubt whether s 3 is properly to be treated as part of the Resource Management Act because it does not 
itself amend the Act. The provisions that amend are carried into the principal Act. And s 3 is relevant to 
their interpretation. To the extent that the amending provisions affect the scheme of the Act, s 3 is 
relevant also in understanding that change in scheme. But it is otherwise spent. Nor does s 3, properly 
construed in the light of the substantive amendments made by the 2004 Amendment Act, affect the 
meaning of s 104(1)(a) or the scheme of the Resource Management beyond those substantive changes. 
  
81  At [21], [25] and [26]. 
82  At [24](a). 
83  At [30]. 
84  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [86]. 
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Section 3 casts light on ss 70A and 104E, but pt 2 of the RMA is unaffected. The result, 
therefore, is that ss 70A and 104E must also be read in light of pt 2. The only way, therefore, to 
reconcile the inherent conflict between ss 3 and 5 is to afford to s 5 the primacy it takes in the Act 
and to read a narrow interpretation of the amendment provisions in the light that s 5 casts. 
D The Legislative History of the Amendment Act 
As well as reading the amendments in light of s 5, it is legitimate to identify the mischiefs that 
Parliament was trying to address with the Amendment Act.85 The Explanatory Note to the Bill, the 
Select Committee Report and Hansard appeared to the majority to give mixed signals.86 In theory, 
exploring legislative history is generally limited to these sources.87 Indeed, anything else might be 
criticised for "delv[ing] into the mind of the legislators or their draftsmen, or committee members" 
for subjective rather than objective purpose.88 However, there is more data available to discover 
Parliament's intention with the Amendment Act and:89 
In interpreting an Act of Parliament, it is proper, and indeed necessary, to have regard to the state of 
affairs existing, and known by Parliament to be existing, at the time. It is a fair presumption that 
Parliament's policy or intention is directed to that state of affairs. 
In a subsequent judgment by a differently constituted majority, the Supreme Court in Allied 
Concrete Ltd v Meltzer and Hayward thoroughly endorses the importance of reference to legislative 
history and context by setting it out at length and relying on it throughout its judgment.90  
Indicators of Parliament's intention with the Amendment Act can be found in the state of affairs 
existing at the time as well as the materials that are examined more commonly for identifying that 
intention. 
The Amendment Act was enacted roughly half way through the nine years of the Fifth Labour 
Government (1999–2008). Under the new all-of-government brand, Sustainability.govt.nz, a range 
of policies were implemented to reduce New Zealand's greenhouse emissions and to fulfil 
commitments under the 1998 Kyoto Protocol. These included the Energy Efficiency and 
  
85  Marac Life Assurance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 1 NZLR 694 (CA); and New Zealand 
Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA). 
86  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [142]. 
87  See Rajamani v R [2007] NZSC 68, [2008] 1 NZLR 723 at 729; and Marac Life Assurance Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 85, at 701.  
88  Felix Frankfurter "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" (1947) 47 Colum L Rev 527 at 538–539, 
cited in Glazebrook, above n 65, at 157–158. 
89  Royal College of Nursing of the UK v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800 (HL). 
90  Allied Concrete Ltd v Meltzer and Hayward [2015] NZSC 7, (2015) 10 NZBLC 99-717. 
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Conservation Act 2000 (EEC Act), from which came the first National Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Strategy (NEECS).91 In its Foreword, the Minister of Energy, Hon Pete Hodgson MP, 
said, "New Zealand's commitment to honour the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas reductions 
reinforces just how important the strategy is to our overall climate change response".92 One of the 
programme outcomes in the NEECS was to identify changes to the RMA to give greater prominence 
to sustainable energy and to investigate "sustainable urban form".93 Other programmes delivered 
through the NEECS were targeted at working with local government to reduce greenhouse 
emissions from their councils' operations and from their communities.94 It is evident that activities 
requiring resource consents (other than discharge to air permits) were anticipated to be leveraged to 
influence New Zealand's greenhouse emissions. 
Other central government policies had specific objectives for reducing greenhouse emissions 
and were also directly relevant to local government decision making. The New Zealand Waste 
Strategy 2002, for example, had targets to reduce organic waste (which creates methane when 
decomposing),95 and the New Zealand Transport Strategy 2002 aimed for a "sustainable transport 
system".96 The Transport Strategy was produced under authority of the Land Transport Act 1988 
and was a mandatory consideration for the development of regional land transport strategies along 
with the NEECS.97 
The main component of the Fifth Labour Government's suite of climate change policies was the 
CCRA. Its original purpose was only to ratify the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol.98 It was envisaged that the CCRA would be 
  
91  Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act 2000, ss 8–12; and Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority 
and Ministry for the Environment National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy: Towards a 
sustainable energy future (September 2001). 
92  Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority and Ministry for the Environment, above n 91, at 1. 
93  At 3, 12, 14 and 16. 
94  Ministry for the Environment "Annual Report on Climate Change Policy Implementation" (2004) 
<www.mfe.govt.nz>; and Diana Shand "Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand: Where the 
rubber hits the road: From policy to action" (presentation to Climate Change: the Policy Challenges 
Symposium, Wellington, October 2006). 
95  Ministry for the Environment Review of Targets in the New Zealand Waste Strategy (2004). 
96  Ministry of Transport New Zealand Transport Strategy (2008) at 2; and Ministry for the Environment, 
above n 94. 
97  Land Transport Act 1988, ss 170–174 and 175(2)(c). 
98  Climate Change Response Act 2002, s 3; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1771 
UNTS 107 (opened for signature 4 June 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) [UNFCC]; and Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2303 UNTS 1 (opened for 
signature 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) [Kyoto Protocol]. 
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amended later to provide for the implementation of preferred policy measures that were still under 
consideration at that time.99 
This state of affairs existed and, given the use of legislation, was known by Parliament to be 
existing at the time of the Amendment Act.100 It provides contextual data for interpreting the 
legislative history's "mixed signals".101  
Along with that state of affairs, the Explanatory Note to the Bill offers particular insights into 
Parliament's intention. The Bill, it says, had three objectives: to support renewable energy and 
energy efficiency; to support climate change adaptation measures; and "to remove climate change as 
a consideration when considering industrial discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as these 
emissions are best addressed using a national mechanism".102 The third objective was responding to 
a lack of clarity on the role of regional councils,103 which would be solved by "remov[ing] explicitly 
the ability of regional councils to control emissions … [so] that emitters only face controls on their 
emissions as a result of national instruments".104 However, such removal was deliberately limited; 
not comprehensive:105 
[T]he objective is to clarify that, although … all those acting under the RMA have energy and climate 
change responsibilities, it is most appropriate to specifically address industrial discharges at the national 
level. The ability to control land uses for climate change purposes remains unchanged. 
Indeed, the Explanatory Note shows that the intention was to create "a stronger legal mandate to 
take into consideration … climate change matters".106  
Originally as drafted, the Bill would excise emissions considerations for industrial and trade 
premises.107 This reference was removed at the select committee phase because of submitters' 
concerns that certain other emissions might still be controlled by regional councils. That said, the 
Select Committee Report still stated that the "new sections 70A and 104E [would] prohibit regional 
  
99  Vernon Rive "New Zealand Climate Change Regulation" in Alastair Cameron (ed) Climate Change Law 
and Policy in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) 165 at 187. 
100  Royal College of Nursing of the UK v Department of Health and Social Security, above n 89. 
101  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [142]. 
102  Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) Amendment Bill 2003 (explanatory note) 
[Amendment Bill 2003 (explanatory note)] at 1 (emphasis added). 
103  At 4.  
104  At 7. 
105  At 5. 
106  At 3–5 (emphasis added). 
107  See (5 August 2003) 610 NZPD 7583 per Pete Hodgson. 
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councils from having regard to the effects of discharges of greenhouse gases in specified 
circumstances".108 Those "specified circumstances" were presumably non-industrial and trade 
premises that still required an air discharge consent, given the remaining specificity of the new 
provisions, and given that those emissions sources were also envisaged to be subjected to a national 
emissions management regime. 
In the Second Reading of the Bill, Hon Judith Tizard MP, speaking on behalf of the Convenor of 
the Ministerial Group on Climate Change, Hon Pete Hodgson MP, said "the Government's 
preference for national control of greenhouse gas emissions does not result in emitters facing 
duplication of controls".109 Whilst the specific reference to industrial and trade premises was 
removed, the mischief that was still being targeted was that potential for double regulation: the 
potential for those emitters who would be subject to national regulation of emissions to also be 
regulated by reference to their emissions via the RMA. 
When the majority stated that the parliamentary history materials give "some mixed signals", 
this may refer to statements in the Explanatory Note such as:110 
New section 70A removes the power of regional councils, in making rules on the discharge of 
greenhouse gases into air, to have regard to the effects of a discharge on climate change. 
… 
New section 104F precludes a consent authority, when considering applications for discharges otherwise 
prohibited by section 15 or section 15B, from having regard to the effects of a discharge on climate 
change. 
However, it appears that these statements are simply suffering from generality and imprecision, 
and are not intended to superimpose a far broader meaning than what is specified in terms of the 
mischiefs that the amendments would manage. It is clear – from the specificity of the statements in 
the legislative history, plus the state of affairs known at the time, plus the text of ss 70A and 104E – 
that the mischiefs being addressed were: first, the need to promote renewable energy (and therefore 
avoid or replace energy derived from fossil fuels); secondly, the need to enable councils to adapt to 
climate change; thirdly, to address uncertainty and potential inconsistency about regional 
management of emissions of a scale that necessitates an air discharge permit; and fourthly, to avoid 
double regulation via both the RMA and some forthcoming national regulation measure (which later 
became the emissions trading scheme (ETS)). 
  
108  Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) Amendment Bill (select committee report) at 6 
(emphasis added). 
109  (17 February 2003) 615 NZPD 11040 per Judith Tizard (emphasis added); and see Amendment Bill 2003 
(explanatory note), above n 102, at 7. 
110  Amendment Bill 2003 (explanatory note), above n 102, at 2. 
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E The Climate Change Response Act 2002 
As the Amendment Act was making its way through the legislative process, Parliament was also 
trying to decide what mechanisms would be put in place to meet New Zealand's Kyoto obligations. 
The CCRA in its original form ratified the Protocol and established the framework, powers and 
institutions needed for New Zealand to fulfil its Kyoto obligations.111 It did not set up a carbon tax 
or an ETS at that time. The carbon tax, which was developed as part of a policy package but not 
legislated for, was intended to apply to emissions from energy supply and use, process emissions 
and fugitive emissions.112 It was only in 2005 – after the 2004 Amendment Act – that the tax option 
was abandoned in favour of the ETS, which then was enacted later in 2008.113 
If we consider the application of the carbon tax as originally envisaged, the language is different 
– energy supply and use, process emissions and fugitive emissions – but it points very much towards 
the original scope of the 2004 Amendment Act: industrial and trade premises.  
The evidence suggests that the considerations carved out from the RMA were intended to mirror 
those emissions sources that would be regulated by the national instrument: the gap carved out of 
regional regulation would be filled by national regulation. We know that the gaps created in the 
"sustainable management" considerations were meant to be filled because, in the Explanatory Note 
to the Bill, there is specific mention made of the risk of a "policy vacuum prior to national price 
mechanisms taking effect" and how those risks were mitigated.114 
F An Alternative Interpretation of Purpose 
On this analysis, it seems Elias CJ's approach to purposive interpretation was closer to 
Parliament's intention. Section 3 of the Amendment Act is a guide to interpretation but anything 
resembling a literal application of its broad language would be out of kilter with Parliament's 
intention, since the effect of that would be to scale down efforts to mitigate emissions. After New 
Zealand became a party to the 1998 Kyoto Protocol, Parliament was ramping up efforts to mitigate 
emissions. The CCRA was intended to be the central pillar of climate change policy, but not the 
whole edifice. Its primary place would be complemented by the RMA, the Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Act 2000 and a range of executive-level strategies and programmes, some of which 
had statutory bases. To be complementary, the possibility of double regulation via the RMA and 
CCRA was to be avoided. To achieve this, consent authorities could no longer regulate greenhouse 
emissions from point-source activities that would be subjected to national regulation. They would, 
  
111  Climate Change Response Bill 2002 (explanatory note). 
112  Rive, above n 99, at 172. 
113  At 187–188. 
114  Amendment Bill 2003 (explanatory note), above n 102, at 9–10. 
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however, remain able to regulate other activities by reference to their addition or avoidance of 
emissions.  
The fact that the coverage of the ETS does not precisely mirror the RMA excision cannot be 
resolved by judicial interpretation: the ETS is a moving target and any gaps or overlap with the 
RMA are for Parliament to resolve. 
V THE SCHEME OF THE RMA 
A Ancillaries and Absurdities 
The primary concern of the majority was that:115 
… the literal approach [to ss 70A and 104E] would allow arguments which are off limits in relation to 
the issues which they are most closely related (namely, discharges to air) to come in, by the backdoor, in 
respect of ancillary issues (such as land use, roading and the like). 
So, to avoid this "absurdity",116 the majority deemed it necessary to remove all regulation by 
reference to greenhouse emissions. In contrast, Elias CJ thought "it would be misleading to 
characterise [these activities] as 'ancillary' or 'collateral'" and would have permitted the s 104(1)(a) 
assessment to examine the effects of end use.117 
The mines were undoubtedly the purpose of all the activities that Buller Coal and Solid Energy 
were seeking consents for, and for that reason I respectfully disagree with Elias CJ. I believe it is 
accurate to describe access roads, substations and the like as ancillary: whilst they are essential 
elements of the development, they are not its purpose. Buller Coal and Solid Energy are not in the 
business of building roads and substations and would not have had an interest in undertaking those 
activities if it were not for the mines. Regulating a primary activity via consents for ancillary 
activities would, in my view, thwart Parliament's intention to avoid double regulation. 
B A Nuanced Solution: Background 
However, a nuanced approach to the RMA's scheme could have avoided "back door" regulation 
without throwing the champagne out with the cork. Before describing the approach being proposed 
here, relevant background matters need to be set out, including a very brief survey of the potential 
roles local government have with respect to mitigating greenhouse emissions. 
The first relevant context is the uncontested law. Regional councils cannot, as per s 70A, make 
rules about discharges of greenhouse gases, nor can they consider the effects of greenhouse gases on 
climate change when assessing air discharge permit applications, as per s 104E. Territorial 
  
115  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [169]. 
116  At [171]. 
117  At [8]. 
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authorities cannot make rules or assess the effects of any discharges of contaminants to air, by virtue 
of their competence not extending to discharges of contaminants to air as per s 31. 
Irrespective of these points, courts and consent authorities had – before and after the 
Amendment Act, but before the West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd decision – considered 
greenhouse emissions from activities that were not point-sources requiring air discharge permits. 
The emissions considered arose from polluting behaviours that were encouraged by activities for 
which consents were sought, for example, increased traffic emissions from the development of a 
shopping complex or office building.118 The risk of double regulation was irrelevant because 
applicants in such circumstances were not the subject of central government regulation via the 
CCRA; they were only the subject of local RMA regulation. Shoppers' increased petrol consumption 
relates to the CCRA, as that affects suppliers of liquid fossil fuels and ultimately their consumers, 
but it does not affect a shopping complex developer.119 Therefore, RMA rules and assessment 
considerations could have pertained to diffuse emissions in such circumstances without double 
regulation. 
Emissions considerations might also have pertained to, not just projects that generated 
emissions, but also to projects that mitigated emissions. A resource consent applicant could have 
sought credit under s 3 of the Principal Act ("meaning of effect") for developments that mitigate 
emissions, such as converting land from a source of emissions (for example, a ruminant animal 
farm) to a use with lower emissions (for example, a subdivision) or to a carbon sink (for example, to 
forestry). Consideration of greenhouse gases in scenarios such as these would not have created any 
"absurd" outcomes. Quite the opposite, in fact, as it would have been consistent with the ethos 
underpinning the allowance for considering avoided emissions resulting from renewable energy 
developments and with Parliament's intention to ramp up mitigation efforts in light of New 
Zealand's obligations at international law. 
These examples give a small insight into how many sources of greenhouse emissions local 
government can influence:120 via waste, transport, renewable energy, economic development, 
district planning and vegetation management. The majority may not have been made aware of this 
potential before it commented that the CCRA leaves "little – and arguably no – scope for useful 
involvement by local authorities".121 The majority may not have been made aware of the global 
  
118  Merton v Rodney District Council EnvC Auckland A8/2007, 2 February 2007 at [33] and [49]. See also AMI 
Ltd v Christchurch City Council [2009] NZEnvC 100 at [97]. 
119 Climate Change Response Act 2002, sch 3, pt 2. 
120  The potential for emissions mitigation via local government is alluded to in the Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Act 2000, s 13(2)(a)(iv), which requires the Minister to consult with local authorities when 
drafting a national energy efficiency and conservation strategy. 
121  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [127]. 
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impetus to support local government-level mitigation measures, such as the United Nations' Cities 
for Climate Change Initiative, the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (an international network 
of cities and mayors tackling emissions) and the Low-Carbon City programme.122 
Given the potential, would it have been possible, in the scheme of the amended RMA, for 
councils to have made rules and assessed greenhouse emissions in such circumstances whilst 
avoiding the "back door" absurdity? A two-step process is required: first, identifying the greenhouse 
emissions outcomes as part of identifying potential effects; and secondly, defining the "development 
as a whole" to bring ancillary activities within the ss 70A and 10E exclusions for primary activities 
that generate greenhouse gases and would, without the Amendment Act provisions, require 
consideration of climate change in air discharge consent applications. 
C Identifying Potential Effects 
For the first step, actual and potential effects (adverse and positive) are identified in various 
RMA processes, including in the development of policy statements and plans,123 and in a 
proponent's assessment of environmental effects.124 Diffuse emissions and/or avoided emissions 
should be identified in those processes, such as those in the examples described above. There is 
nothing in the Amendment Act to permit councils and applicants to evade transparency in 
identifying and declaring greenhouse gas outcomes. 
Section 70A only removes the ability for regional councils to make rules relating to discharges 
of greenhouse gases. By focusing on regional councils and on discharges of emissions, Parliament 
intended to permit territorial authorities to regulate diffuse sources of emissions. Similarly, s 104E 
only removes the consideration of greenhouse emissions for discharges to air permits. Otherwise, 
councils must make rules for and consider any "actual or potential effects", as per ss 3(e) (the 
meaning of effect), 30(1)(b) (functions of regional councils), 31(1)(b) (functions of territorial 
authorities), 68(3) (regional rules) and, of course, 104(1)(a) (consideration of applications), amongst 
other references throughout the RMA. 
In terms of how diffuse emissions might be connected to the activity for which consents are 
sought, there has been judicial consideration of "potential effect".  It does not mean that "no risk 
should be acceptable".125 It also does not apply to matters (such as landscaping) that are:126 
  
122  See "Cities and Climate Change Initiative" UN Habitat <www.unhabitat.org>; C40 Cities <www.c40.org>; 
and "Low-carbon City" ICLEI <www.iclei.org>. 
123  Resource Management Act 1991, s 32. 
124  Section 88(2)(b) and sch 4. On substantive adequacy of assessments of environmental effects, see Derek 
Nolan Environmental & Resource Management Law (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at [18.29]. 
125  See Aquamarine Ltd v Southland Regional Council EnvC Christchurch C126/97, 15 December 1997 at 144–
146, affirmed in Francks v Canterbury Regional Council [2005] NZRMA 97 (HC) at 104. 
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… totally ancillary to the activity [of constructing a petrol station] and incapable of contributing 
cumulatively to the effects of the activity … [and] will not increase the intensity of the activity nor alter 
the character of the activity… [nor] increase the size of the site of the proposed activity. 
Essentially, a "potential effect" does not include very minor effects. This is because the 
approach adopted by the courts relates to orthodox methods of risk assessment, as explained in the 
Court of Appeal in Dye v Auckland Regional Council:127 
Potential effects, in contrast [to cumulative effects], are effects which may happen or they may not. 
Their definition incorporates levels of probability of occurrence. A high probability of occurrence is 
enough to qualify the potential effect as an effect, whereas a potential effect which has a low probability 
of occurrence qualifies as an effect only if its occurrence would have a high potential impact.  
To this end, those effects that are relevant issues for consideration are "all reasonably foreseeable 
effects", and what this means is best explained by use of an example.128 In Aquamarine Ltd v 
Southland Regional Council, it was decided that the effects were not limited to those resulting from 
the activities for which consent was sought, which were for the development of a pipeline and a 
moor, so that fresh water could be taken from the environment and put into a tanker. Rather, the 
effects included those from boats' passages and discharges.129 In reaching that decision, Judge 
Skelton illustrates the relevance of "reasonably foreseeable effects" by referring to scenarios in 
which proposed activities, such as supermarkets, will have consequential traffic effects that "are 
regularly and hitherto without question regarded as relevant considerations".130  
Diffuse emissions such as those from increased traffic effects were within Parliament's 
contemplations during the passage of the Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) 
Amendment Bill:131  
The bill specifically provides that councils should still consider the effects on climate change of their 
other decisions. Those decisions are legion. When a supermarket wants to locate a long way from town, 
the council has the right to consider how many more vehicle kilometres will have to be travelled for 
  
126 Shell New Zealand Ltd v Porirua City Council HC Wellington CIV-2003-485-1476, 21 December 2004 at 
[57] 
127 Dye v Auckland Regional Council, above n 45, at [39]; and see Sea-Tow Ltd v Auckland Regional Council 
EnvC Auckland A066/2006, 30 May 2006 at [341]–[342]. 
128  Aquamarine Ltd v Southland Regional Council (1996) 2 ELRNZ 361 (EnvC) at 366. 
129  Aquamarine Ltd v Southland Regional Council, above n 128. See also Beadle v Minister of Corrections 
EnvC Wellington A074/2002, 8 April 2002 at [70]–[91]; and Cayford v Waikato Regional Council EnvC 
Auckland A127/98, 23 October 1998 at 10. 
130  Aquamarine Ltd v Southland Regional Council, above n 128, at 366. 
131  (5 August 2003) 610 NZPD 7596 per Jeanette Fitzsimons. 
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people to get to that supermarket if it is away from where people live and away from public transport 
routes. 
It seems virtually certain that such scenarios were in mind when it was stated in the Explanatory 
Note that "[t]he ability to control land uses for climate change purposes remains unchanged".132 
Since the emissions from traffic stimulated by a supermarket development would be dwarfed by 
those eventuating from a coal mine, it seems certain that Parliament's intention was that the 
emissions resulting from coal's eventual combustion would satisfy the majority's questions about 
"tangibility" and cumulative effects.133 
D "The Development as a Whole" 
What remains, however, is avoiding "back door" regulation of activities requiring air discharge 
consents. For this, we must seek some way of limiting what effects can be considered, to give effect 
to the purpose of the Amendment Act. 
In Burton v Auckland City Council, when determining what effects were to be considered with 
one of a number of resource consents, Blanchard J said:134 
It seems to me that, at least where the other resource consent applications are to be made to the same 
consent authority, the assessment of actual or potential effects, as prepared in accordance with the 
Fourth Schedule, must take into account relevant cumulative effects of the development as a whole. 
In that case, the concept of "the development as a whole" was directed at capturing all of the 
effects of a development that required multiple consents. A concept of this nature was alluded to by 
Elias CJ in West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd in describing "the overall mining proposal".135 
This "development as a whole" concept was aimed at ensuring that the Act's "sustainable 
management" and "integrated management" objectives were not subverted by incremental effects of 
discrete activities which, on their own, may have only minor effects.136 
The same concept can, I contend, be used to avoid "back door" considerations of discharges to 
air. If greenhouse emissions that would (except for ss 70A and 104E) be the subject of an air 
discharge consent are identified in the assessment of environmental effects, then it becomes 
apparent to the consent authority that those emissions are, by extension of the effects of s 104E, 
irrelevant considerations for assessing under s 104(1)(a) the effects of activities that are "ancillary" 
  
132  Amendment Bill 2003 (explanatory note), above n 102, at 5. 
133  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [121]–[127]. 
134  Burton v Auckland City Council [1994] NZRMA 544 (HC) at 554 (emphasis added). 
135  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [8]. 
136  Sections 5(2), 30(1)(a) and 31(1)(a); Burton v Auckland City Council, above n 134, at 554; and Aquamarine 
Ltd v Southland Regional Council, above n 128, at 366–367. 
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to a "development as a whole". There is some uncertainty with this approach insofar as determining 
a trigger for excluding consideration of greenhouse emissions, but this would be resolved on a case-
by-case basis according to the facts, and precedent indicators would evolve through case law. 
Furthermore, this "development as a whole" approach could borrow from the established principle 
of "overlapping consents" relied on for bundling multiple consent applications. This was 
summarised by Woolford J in Newbury Holdings Ltd v Auckland Council:137 
This occurs where there is such an overlap of the consents that, for the sake of efficiency, it makes sense 
to bundle the overlapping consents and then apply the most restrictive status to all of them. 
The "sake of efficiency" includes where the consideration of one consent may affect the outcome of 
another.138 It will be apparent on the facts of a case whether, for example, the activity requiring a 
land use consent "overlaps" with another activity requiring an air discharge permit. It is obvious 
here, for example, that the ancillary activities were intrinsically related to the main coal mining 
activity. 
Rather than a major expansion of the reach of ss 70A and 104E, this alternative, "development 
as a whole" approach gives effect to the purpose of the Amendment Act as defined above. It 
involves only a relatively minor qualification on the s 104(1)(a) assessment, it is consistent with the 
approach to bundling "overlapping" consents, and it is also consistent with authorities relating to 
courts correcting drafting errors. 
VI CORRECTING DRAFTING ERRORS AND FILLING GAPS 
"Words cannot be given 'meanings' they are incapable of bearing."139 
The majority did not state which provision of the Amendment Act is relied on for their decision 
but, as already noted, the most likely candidate is s 104E. However, to rely on s 104E required more 
than interpretation and indeed more than "stretching" the meaning of the words. It required a 
conclusion that there was a drafting error which caused absurdity that the court fixed as a matter of 
necessity. The majority explained:140  
[T]he most likely explanation for the form of the 2004 Amendment Act is that those responsible for its 
drafting assumed the climate change arguments could only be advanced in relation to rules and consents 
involving direct discharges. In other words, the drafters did not envision that those same arguments 
  
137  Newbury Holdings Ltd v Auckland Council [2013] NZHC 1172 at [59]; and see Bayley v Manukau City 
Council [1999] 1 NZLR 568 at 576; Hamilton v Far North District Council [2015] NZEnvC 12 at [16]–
[17]; and Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council [2013] NZEnvC 250 
at [44]. 
138  Tairua Marine Ltd v Waikato Regional Council HC Auckland CIV 2005-485-1490, 29 June 2006 at [30]. 
139  Burrows and Carter, above n 61, at 202. 
140  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [168]. 
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could be made in relation to rules and consents relating to activities which indirectly result in, or 
facilitate the discharge of greenhouse gases. For the reasons given, such an assumption would have been 
very reasonable. 
It would have been helpful if the majority had attempted to describe how the provision might have 
been rewritten without the error, so I will attempt to do so.  
In its original state, s 104E provides:141 
When considering an application for a discharge permit or coastal permit to do something that would 
otherwise contravene section 15 or section 15B relating to the discharge into air of greenhouse gases, a 
consent authority must not have regard to the effects of such a discharge on climate change. 
On the majority's interpretation, s 104E would read something akin to: "When considering any 
resource consent application, a consent authority must not have regard to the effects of any 
discharge of greenhouse gases on climate change." 
Similarly, as enacted, s 70A provides:142 
[W]hen making a rule to control the discharge into air of greenhouse gases under its functions under 
section 30(1)(d)(iv) or (f), a regional council must not have regard to the effects of such a discharge on 
climate change. 
On the majority's interpretation, s 70A would read something akin to: 
[W]hen making rules under its functions under s 30 or s 31, a consent authority must not have regard to 
the effects on climate change of any discharge of greenhouse gas emissions… 
When rewritten like this, it is clear that the changes necessitated by the majority's reasoning were 
not minor but actually significant. The question arises whether that was justifiable. In Inco Europe 
Ltd v First Choice Distribution, the House of Lords accepted that courts can fix "obvious drafting 
errors", subject to stringent conditions:143 
This power is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes. … [T]he courts exercise considerable caution 
before adding or omitting or substituting words. Before interpreting a statute in this way the court must 
be abundantly sure of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) 
that by inadvertence the draftsmen or Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in 
question; and (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily 
the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The third of these 
  
141 Emphasis added. 
142  Emphasis added. 
143  Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 2 All ER 109 (HL) at 115. See also Jones v Wrotham 
Park Settled Estates and anor [1979] 1 All ER 286 (HL) at 289 per Lord Diplock. 
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conditions is of crucial importance. Otherwise any attempt to determine the meaning of the enactment 
would cross the boundary between construction and legislation. … 
Sometimes, even when these conditions are met, the court may find itself inhibited from interpreting the 
statutory provisions in accordance with what it is satisfied was the underlying intention of Parliament. 
The alteration in language may be too far-reaching. In Western Bank Ltd v Schindler [1977] Ch. 1, 18, 
Lord Scarman observed that the insertion must not be too big, or too much at variance with the language 
used by the legislature. 
It is worth reiterating Lord Nicholls' very strong language to specify the limitations –"plain cases of 
drafting mistakes", "considerable caution", "must be abundantly sure", "crucial importance".144 
Cooke P also espoused caution with respect to filling supposed gaps in legislation:145 
Courts must try to make the Act work while taking care not themselves to usurp the policy-making 
function, which rightly belongs to Parliament. The Courts can in a sense fill gaps in an Act but only in 
order to make the Act work as Parliament must have intended. 
When gaps have been filled in prior judgments, the alterations read in are minor in comparison 
to those effected in West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd. For example, in R v Wall, a qualification 
was implied into a provision in the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978. The provision prevented 
the admission of evidence from intercepted communications relating to offences other than drug 
dealing offences.146 The qualification read in was that communications that evidenced both drug 
dealing and other offences was admissible, otherwise a person who admitted to drug dealing and 
murder would be better off than someone who admitted only to drug dealing, because the evidence 
of the other offence could not be admitted. This met the test that "[v]ery strong reasons are essential 
before a Court is justified in departing from the apparent plain meaning".147 
 A similarly minor qualification was also implied into a provision in Re Bank of New Zealand. 
Under the Companies Act 1993, companies are required to add the word "Limited" to their name 
when they re-register. However, a qualification was read into that requirement, which was that 
"Limited" did not need to be added to the company name "Bank of New Zealand" because the 
bank's name was specified in the statute that established it. Reading in that qualification, the 
  
144  Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution, above n 143, at 115, citing with approval Jones v Wrotham Park, 
above n 141. 
145  Northland Milk Vendors Association Inc v Northern Milk Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 530 (HC) at 538. 
146  R v Wall [1983] NZLR 238 (CA) at 240. 
147  At 240 per Cooke J. 
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provision still "function[ed] within a wider whole"148 and did not affect any "wider and contrary 
policy matters".149 
Referring back to the three tests for fixing drafting errors in Inco Europe, these conditions are 
predicated on a purposive interpretation, as is Cooke P's observation in Northland Milk Vendors 
Association Inc v Northern Milk Ltd. The purpose of the Amendment Act was, according to my 
analysis, only to carve out consideration of greenhouse emissions related to projects that require an 
air discharge permit. Even without that interpretation, the rephrased ss 104E and 70A above shows 
that the majority's interpretation was, as Elias CJ said in dissent, a "substantial gloss of the terms of 
the statute to exclude such considerations".150 It was beyond the gloss envisaged by the House of 
Lords in Inco Europe. It was also inconsistent with the additional concern of the High Court in Re 
Bank of New Zealand for "wider and contrary policy matters", insofar as the wholesale removal of 
climate change considerations from the RMA curtails New Zealand's efforts to scale up mitigation 
efforts without double regulation via the CCRA and RMA.151 By comparison, the gloss that I have 
proposed is a minor qualification that, I contend, meets the stringent tests in Inco Europe, is 
consistent with scale of corrections in R v Wall and Re Bank of New Zealand, and is consistent with 
Parliament's intentions. 
VII INTERNATIONAL LAW CONTEXT 
The RMA predates developments in international climate change law and the Explanatory Note 
to the Bill for the Amendment Act does not purport to have a specific role in meeting any of New 
Zealand's international obligations, although it does state that it is "consistent with the direction of 
the Kyoto Protocol".152 Regardless of these facts, there is nothing preventing the court from 
referring to international law when interpreting the RMA. Indeed, before the 2004 Amendment Act, 
the Environment Court had deemed international climate change instruments to be relevant 
considerations.153  
The principle for employing international instruments in statutory interpretation was enunciated 
by Keith J in New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association v Attorney-General:154 
  
148  Re Bank of New Zealand [1997] 2 NZLR 239 (HC) at 250. 
149  At 251. 
150  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [24]. 
151  Re Bank of New Zealand, above n 148, at 251. 
152  Amendment Bill 2003 (explanatory note), above n 102, at 8.  
153  Environmental Defence Society Inc v Auckland Regional Council [2002] NZRMA 492 (EnvC) at [28]. 
154  New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association Inc v Attorney-General [1997] 3 NZLR 269 (CA) at 289 per Keith 
J. See also Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 (SC) at [21], [24] and [32]; 
Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) at [265]–[266]; Ashby v Minister of Immigration 
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We begin with the presumption of statutory interpretation that so far as its wording allows legislation 
should be read in a way which is consistent with New Zealand's international obligations. That 
presumption may apply whether or not the legislation was enacted with the purpose of implementing the 
relevant text. … The application of the presumption depends on both the international text and the 
related national statute. 
In the Environment Court, a request to consider an interpretation of the Amendment Act in light of 
the international setting was refused because of the caveat in Keith J's statement. Newhook LJ 
stated:155 
[Although] this principle of statutory interpretation will arise where the wording of the legislation 
allows, or there is ambiguity, or where the Court for one reason or another has a choice of interpretation 
… I am not persuaded that there is any discretion concerning interpretation, or any ambiguity or choice. 
In the High Court, Whata J did not respond to counsel's concern that fettering local 
government's consideration of greenhouse emissions by implication was contrary to New Zealand's 
commitment to international convention.156 In the Supreme Court, Elias CJ noted that those 
emissions that are not subject to the RMA under her interpretation of the Amendment Act would be, 
"[f]or the purposes of limiting emissions to fulfil New Zealand's international obligations … 
managed by the Emissions Trading Scheme".157 The majority described the international context, 
such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and noted that:158 
The Climate Change Response Act established the machinery which was necessary to ensure that New 
Zealand was able to comply directly with its obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
The majority also noted that New Zealand has declined to give a further commitment beyond the 
expiry of the Kyoto Protocol. Beyond those observations, the majority made no statement on 
whether international law could colour the interpretation of the Amendment Act, so one is forced to 
presume that the majority reasoned that the language of the Amendment Act could not bear an 
interpretation other than that which they concluded upon. It would have been desirable for the 
majority to have been explicit about that. 
The analysis above shows that there are at least three potential interpretations of the purpose of 
the amended RMA as it affects the interpretation of the provisions at play, ss 104(1)(a) and 104E: 
  
[1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA) at 226; and Puli'uvea v Removal Review Authority [1996] 3 NZLR 538 (CA) at 
541–542. 
155  Buller Coal Ltd v West Coast Ent, above n 2, at [38] 
156  Royal Forest and Bird v Buller Coal, above n 4, at [7](g). 
157  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [44], and see [66]. 
158  At [101] (emphasis added). 
 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE RMA: A CRITIQUE OF WEST COAST ENT INC V BULLER COAL LTD 1141 
 
the majority's, Elias CJ's and mine. As the caveat in New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association v 
Attorney-General is that an international lens is not used only when the text cannot bear it, the range 
of possible interpretations demands that we fall back on the presumption of consistency. In fact, the 
plain text cannot directly bear the majority's interpretation either, so an international lens cannot be 
avoided on that. 
There are principles contained in the relevant international instruments that could guide the 
interpretation of the amended RMA. The UNFCCC, for example, sets out principles such as: "The 
Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind"; and "The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change".159 The Kyoto Protocol sets out obligations such as: "Each 
Party … shall … implement and/or elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national 
circumstances".160 
The Ministry for the Environment has forecast that New Zealand will meet and, indeed, slightly 
exceed its specified 2008–2012 mitigation target under the Kyoto Protocol.161 One might argue that 
this negatives any requirement to interpret the RMA amendments in any way that enables further 
mitigation of climate change, and it may do. There are, however, multiple reasons why the 
international context must persist as an tool for interpreting how the Amendment Act affected the 
RMA.  
First, the UNFCCC exists as international law in perpetuity, and so does the Kyoto Protocol, at 
least until it is replaced by an updated protocol. Secondly, New Zealand remains a party to those 
instruments and the object of protecting the climate system by minimising the causes of climate 
change. Thirdly, New Zealand is an active participant in ongoing negotiations to secure a binding 
agreement that succeeds the Kyoto Protocol and it has adopted voluntary emissions reduction 
targets, and both of these facts signal an ongoing intention to cooperate in and be bound by 
international efforts to mitigate climate change.162 Fourthly, the Conference of Parties to the 
UNFCCC, which includes New Zealand, has agreed in the non-binding Copenhagen Accord "that 
the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius",163 which will require 
  
159  UNFCCC, above n 98, arts 3(1) and 3(3). 
160  Kyoto Protocol, above n 98, art 2(1)(a). 
161  Ministry for the Environment "New Zealand's net position under the Kyoto Protocol" (11 April 2014) 
<www.mfe.govt.nz>. 
162  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade "Environment: Shaping a global response to Climate Change" (2 
July 2014) <www.mfat.govt.nz>; and New Zealand Government "Submission to the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action: Work Stream 1" (March 2014) at United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change "Submissions from Parties to the ADP in 2014" 
<www.unfccc.int>. 
163  Copenhagen Accord, above n 18, art 1. 
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massive cuts in global emissions eventually reaching zero emissions.164 Fifthly, in the same way 
that achieving some goals of international human rights instruments does not bring their relevance 
to an end, meeting initial, short-term climate change targets (as the Ministry has forecast with 
respect to the Kyoto) does not satisfy the longer-term objective. Sixthly, because another legislative 
instrument specifically gives effect to the relevant international instruments, that does not discount 
the relevance of those international instruments to other domestic legislation. If that were so, then 
international human rights norms, for example, would apply to a very limited range of enactments. 
In that context, it is proper "to assume that our Parliament did not intend to legislate 
inconsistently with New Zealand's international obligations".165 Here, that would mean preferring 
an interpretation that does not prohibit local regulation of sources of greenhouse gas emissions 
which are not directly affected by the Amendment Act. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The majority's conclusion was that "it is not open to territorial authorities and regional councils 
to regulate activities by reference to the effect on climate change of discharges of greenhouse gas 
emissions".166 This effectively removes all consideration of greenhouse gases, whether those gases 
are emitted directly, indirectly, diffusely, or in fact reduced. Could it have really been Parliament's 
true intention to remove from the internal workings of the New Zealand's principal piece of 
environmental legislation virtually all opportunities, both negative and positive, to consider the one 
environmental issue that adversely affects all others?  
The majority's conclusion was not inevitable. The analysis here leads to the alternative 
conclusion that the effect of the 2004 Amendment Act was two-fold. First, it explicitly removed the 
consideration of greenhouse gas emissions with respect to air discharge permits. Secondly, it 
implicitly removed the consideration of greenhouse gases for activities that are ancillary to a 
"development as a whole" which requires an air discharge permit. 
How would this conclusion have affected the outcome of the West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal 
Ltd decision? Since the purpose of the development as a whole was to mine (but not combust) the 
coal, the coal's ultimate end use should have been deemed a potential adverse effect that was, 
therefore, to be considered during the application and decision making processes. The land use 
activities were indeed ancillary to the main development, but since that development did not include 
an air discharge permit, then the excisions of ss 70A and 104E were irrelevant.  
  
164  Macey, above n 16, at 49. 
165  Burrows and Carter, above n 61, at 26. 
166  West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd, above n 1, at [175]. 
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This outcome would have resulted in double regulation: via the RMA and via the CCRA. 167 
However, if that was considered to be an undesirable outcome, then either the RMA or the CCRA 
could have been amended in a manner that suited Parliament. It was not up to the Supreme Court to 
decide which of those policy solutions was preferable. 
  
  
167 Climate Change Response Act 2002, sch 3, pt 1, subpt 1. 
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